Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these rules suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2014) studied the complexity of dishonest behavior in nearly single-peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure.
Introduction
Voting is an ubiquitous method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making. It has applications in many settings ranging from politics to artificial intelligence and further topics in computer science (see, e.g., the work of Dwork, Kumar, Naor, and Sivakumar (2001) , Ephrati and Rosenschein (1997) , Ghosh, Mundhe, Hernandez, and Sen (1999) ). In the presence of huge data volumes, the computational properties of voting rules gain great importance. In particular, it is desirable to be able to quickly determine the winner(s) of an election. On the other hand it should be computationally hard to find strategies for dishonest behavior. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989a) were the first to study the computational aspects of dishonest behavior in elections. They defined and studied manipulation in voting, i.e., a group of voters casts their votes insincerely in order to reach a desired outcome. Another type of dishonest behavior is control, where an external agent makes structural changes to the election such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters in order to reach a desired outcome. Control has been studied first also by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1992) . There is also bribery, where an external agent changes some voters' votes in order to change the outcome of the election (see, e.g., the work of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2009) ). For an overview and many natural examples of bribery, control, and manipulation we refer to the literature (Baumeister, Erdélyi, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe, 2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2010; Faliszewski & Procaccia, 2010; Brandt, Conitzer, & Endriss, 2013; Rothe, 2015; Brandt, Conitzer, Endriss, Lang, & Procaccia, 2016) .
Traditionally, the complexity of such "attacks" is studied under the assumption that, in each election, any admissible vote can occur. However, there are many elections where the diversity of the votes is limited in the sense that there are admissible votes nobody would ever cast. One of the best known examples is single-peakedness, introduced by Black (1948) . It assumes that the votes are polarized along some linear axis and voters prefer candidates closer to their ideal candidate on this axis over candidates farther away. The study of the computational aspects of elections with single-peaked preferences was initiated by Walsh (2007) (see also the fundamental work of Rothe (2011), and Brandt, Brill, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2015) ). The general conclusion of these papers is that many problems which are NP-hard in the general case turn out to be easy for single-peaked societies.
A recent line of research initiated by Conitzer (2009) suggests that many elections are not perfectly single-peaked but are close to it with respect to some measure. In the work of Faliszewski et al. (2014) various notions of nearly single-peaked elections were introduced and it was shown that the complexity of manipulative actions jumps back to NP-hardness in many cases. This paper is the first to systematically study notions of distances for nearly singlepeaked electorates. Our main contributions are:
• We introduce three new notions of nearly single-peakedness. In addition, we study six notions that already have been defined or suggested in the literature.
• We explore connections between both existing and new notions by providing inequalities. These allow one to compare these notions and better understand their relationship.
• We analyze the computational complexity of computing the distance of arbitrary preference profiles to single-peakedness. In most cases we show NP-completeness. For the k-candidate deletion distance, we present a polynomial-time algorithm.
• Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of the nearly single-peaked evaluation problem, where the task is to compute the distance for a given axis.
Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in the proceedings of AAAI 2013, the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Erdélyi, Lackner, & Pfandler, 2013) , and COM-SOC 2012, the 4th International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (Erdélyi, Lackner, & Pfandler, 2012) . Related Work. Our paper fits in the line of research on single-peaked and nearly singlepeaked preferences. In the work of Faliszewski et al. (2011) and Brandt et al. (2015) the complexity of winner problems and of dishonest behavior (e.g., manipulation and control) in electorates with single-peaked preferences is investigated. These papers do not consider nearly single-peaked preferences, but mention them as future work.
Preliminaries
Let C be a finite set of candidates and let ≻ be a total order on C. Let P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ) be a preference profile, i.e., a list of total orders on the candidate set C. An election is defined as a pair E = (C, P), where C is the set of candidates and P a preference profile on C. We say that ≻ i is the vote of voter i. For simplicity we write ≻ i : c 1 c 2 . . . c m instead of c 1 ≻ i c 2 ≻ i · · · ≻ i c m . For a vote ≻ i : c 1 c 2 . . . c m let the vote ≻ i : c m c m−1 . . . c 1 denote the reverse vote of ≻ i . For two preference profiles on the same set of candidates P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ) and L = (≻ n+1 , . . . , ≻ s ), let (P, L) = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ s ) define the union of the two preference profiles. In our constructions, we sometimes insert a subset of the candidates B ⊆ C into a vote, where we assume some arbitrary, fixed order of the candidates in B (e.g., ≻ i : c 1 Bc 3 means that c 1 is the top-ranked candidate of voter i and c 3 is the last ranked candidate, whereas all b ∈ B are ranked between c 1 and c 3 ).
Definition 2.1. Let an axis A be a total order on C denoted by >. Furthermore, let ≻ be a vote with top-ranked candidate c. The vote ≻ is single-peaked with respect to A if for any x, y ∈ C, if x > y > c or c > y > x then c ≻ y ≻ x has to hold.
A preference profile P is said to be single-peaked with respect to an axis A if and only if each vote is single-peaked with respect to A. A preference profile P is said to be single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is single-peaked with respect to A.
Analogously to reverse votes, the to axis A reverse axis will be denoted by A. Let C ′ ⊆ C. By P[C ′ ] we denote the profile P restricted to the candidates in C ′ . Analogously if A is an axis on C, we denote by A[C ′ ] the axis A restricted to candidates in C ′ . Escoffier, Lang, andÖztürk (2008) present an algorithm that decides whether a given preference profile is single-peaked consistent in time O(m · n). Their algorithm improves upon the runtime of the original algorithm by Bartholdi and Trick (1986) . The corresponding decision problem is defined as follows.
Single-Peaked Consistency

Given:
An election E = (C, P). Question: Is P single-peaked consistent?
If an axis is given additionally in the input, we have the evaluation problem. Since Single-Peaked Consistency can be solved in O(m · n) time, so can Single-Peaked Evaluation.
Single-Peaked Evaluation
Given:
An election E = (C, P) and an axis A. Question: Is P single-peaked with respect to A?
Nearly Single-peaked Preferences
In real-world settings one has to expect a certain amount of "noise" in preference data. The single-peakedness property is very fragile and thus susceptible to such noise. The following example illustrates the fragility of single-peakedness: Consider the single-peaked election consisting of two kinds of votes: abcd and dcba. Assume that both votes have been cast by a large number of voters. This election is single-peaked only with respect to the axis a > b > c > d and its reverse. Adding a single vote abdc destroys the single-peakedness property although this vote is almost identical to the first kind of votes.
In this section we formally define different notions of nearly single-peakedness. All these notions define a distance measure 1 to single-peaked profiles. We will now describe them with help of a running example and provide first (trivial) upper bounds on these distances.
The following notions of nearly single-peakedness are defined for profiles. The same definitions also hold for elections and thus we do not strictly distinguish between elections and profiles. Throughout the following definitions let E = (C, P) be an election and k be a positive integer.
k-Voter Deletion (VD )
The first formal definition of nearly single-peaked societies was given by Faliszewski et al. (2014) , however the idea of removing voters that are not single-peaked dates back to Conitzer (2009) . Consider a preference profile P for which most voters are single-peaked with respect to some axis A. The voters that are not single-peaked with respect to A are referred to as mavericks by Faliszewski et al. (2014) . The number of mavericks, i.e., the number of voters that have to be deleted, defines a natural distance measure to singlepeakedness. If an axis can be found for a large subset of the voters, this is still a fundamental observation about the structure of the preference profile.
Definition 3.1 (Faliszewski et al. (2014) ). A profile P is k-voter deletion single-peaked with respect to an axis A if by removing at most k votes from P one can obtain a preference profile P ′ that is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-voter deletion singlepeaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-voter deletion single-peaked with respect to A. Let VD(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-voter deletion single-peaked consistent.
Note that VD(P) ≤ n−1 always holds. We remark that k-voter deletion single-peaked is also referred to as k-maverick-SP (Faliszewski et al., 2014) and as k-maverick single-peaked consistent (Erdélyi et al., 2013) . Example 1. Consider an election with C = {a, b, c, d, e} and P = {≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ 202 }. We define ≻ 1 : abced, ≻ 2 : edcab, the votes ≻ 3 . . . ≻ 102 : abcde, and the remaining votes ≻ 103 . . . ≻ 202 : edcba. Notice that any preference profile containing abcde and edcba may only be single-peaked consistent with respect to the axis a > b > c > d > e and its reverse. Since ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are not single-peaked with respect to this axis, P is not single-peaked. Deleting ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 obviously yields single-peaked consistency and thus we have VD(P) = 2.
k-Candidate Deletion (CD )
As suggested by Escoffier et al. (2008) , let us consider deleting candidates to obtain a singlepeaked profile. This distance measure can be particularly useful if there are candidates that do not have "a correct place" on any axis. Examples could be candidates that are not wellknown (e.g., a new political party) or candidates that prioritize other topics than most candidates and thereby are judged by voters according to different criteria. The votes restricted to the remaining candidates might still have a clear and significant structure, in particular they might be single-peaked consistent. Definition 3.2. A profile P is k-candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to an axis A if there exists a set C ′ ⊆ C obtained by removing at most k candidates from C such that P[C ′ ] is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-candidate deletion singlepeaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to A. Let CD(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-candidate deletion single-peaked consistent.
Note that CD(P) ≤ m − 2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Consider the preference profile P as defined above. Observe that for C ′ = {b, c, d}, P[C ′ ] is single-peaked consistent. Deleting a single candidate does not yield single-peaked consistency and thus CD(P) = 2.
k-Local Candidate Deletion (LCD )
Personal friendships or hatreds between voters and candidates could move candidates up or down in a vote. These personal relationships cannot be reflected in a global axis; this is an obstacle to single-peakedness already discussed by Conitzer (2009) . To eliminate the influence of personal relationships to some candidates we define a local version of the previous notion. This notion can also deal with the possibility that the least favorite candidates might be ranked without special consideration or even randomly.
We first have to define partial domains and partial profiles.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a set of candidates and A an axis on C. A vote ≻ on a candidate set C ′ ⊂ C is called a partial vote. It is said to be single-peaked with respect to A if it is single-peaked with respect to A[C ′ ]. A partial preference profile consists of partial votes. It is called single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that its partial votes are single-peaked with respect to A.
Definition 3.4. A profile P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to an axis A if by removing at most k candidates from each vote in P we obtain a partial preference profile P ′ that is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to A. Let LCD(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked consistent.
Note that LCD(P) ≤ m − 2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Note that it is sufficient to remove candidate a from vote ≻ 1 and candidate e from vote ≻ 2 to obtain single-peaked consistency. Consequently, LCD(P) = 1.
k-Additional Axes (AA)
Another suggestion by Escoffier et al. (2008) was to consider the minimum number of axes such that each vote is single-peaked with respect to at least one of these axes. This notion is particularly useful if each candidate represents opinions on several issues (as it is the case in political elections). A voter's ranking of the candidates would then depend on which issue is considered most important by the voter and consequently each issue might give rise to its own corresponding axis.
Definition 3.5. A profile P is k-additional axes single-peaked with respect to axes A 1 , . . . , A k+1 if there exists a partition P 1 , . . . , P k+1 of P such that the subprofile P 1 is single-peaked consistent with respect to A 1 , P 2 is single-peaked with respect to A 2 , etc. Furthermore, P is k-additional axes single-peaked consistent if there exist k + 1 axes A 1 , . . . , A k+1 such that P is k-additional axes single-peaked with respect to A 1 , . . . , A k+1 . Let AA(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-additional axes single-peaked consistent.
Note that AA(P) < min n, m! 2 always holds. This is because the number of distinct votes is bounded by m! 2 , since at most m! distinct votes exist and each vote and its reverse are single-peaked with respect to the same axis.
Example 1 (continued). Notice that ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 are single-peaked consistent with respect to axis b > a > c > e > d. The remaining votes are consistent with respect to a > b > c > d > e. Thus, one additional axis is sufficient and hence AA(P) = 1.
k-Global Swaps (GS )
There is a second method of dealing with candidates that are "not placed correctly" according to an axis A. Instead of deleting them from either the candidate set C or from a vote, we could try to move them to the correct position. We do this by performing a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. We remark that the minimum number of swaps required to change one vote to another is the Kendall tau distance (Kendall, 1938) of these two votes. For example, to get from vote abcd to vote adbc, we first have to swap candidates c and d, and then we have to swap b and d. Since swaps change a vote only in a subtle way, k-global swaps can be considered a less obtrusive notion than k-(local) candidate deletion. Definition 3.6. A profile P is k-global swaps single-peaked with respect to an axis A if P can be made single-peaked with respect to A by performing at most k swaps of consecutive candidates in the profile. Furthermore, we say that the profile P is k-global swaps singlepeaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-global swaps single-peaked with respect to A. Let GS(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent.
Note that these swaps can be performed wherever we want -we can have k swaps in only one vote, or one swap each in k votes. Since rearranging a total order to obtain any other total order requires at most m 2 swaps, we know that GS(P) ≤ m 2 · n.
Example 1 (continued). It is possible to make P single-peaked consistent by swapping d and e in vote ≻ 1 and swapping a and b in vote ≻ 2 . This gives GS(P) = 2.
k-Local Swaps (LS )
We can also consider a "local", per-vote budget for swaps, i.e., we allow up to k swaps per vote. This distance measure has been introduced by Faliszewski et al. (2014) as Dodgson k . Definition 3.7. A profile P is k-local swaps single-peaked with respect to an axis A if P can be made single-peaked with respect to A by performing at most k swaps per vote. Furthermore, P is k-local swaps single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-local swaps single-peaked with respect to A. Let LS(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-local swaps single-peaked consistent.
Note that LS(P) ≤ m 2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Since only one swap is required in ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 each, we have LS(P) = 1. Faliszewski et al. (2014) also introduce the PerceptionFlip k distance. An election E = (C, P) is k-perception flip single-peaked with respect to an axis A if for every vote V in P, the axis A can be transformed to an axis A ′ by at most k swaps of consecutive candidates so that V is single-peaked with respect to A ′ . We show in the following lemma that PerceptionFlip k and k-Local Swaps are identical. In other words, we show that swapping consecutive candidates in the vote or in the axis has the same "power".
Lemma 3.8. Let E = (C, P) be an election and A an axis on C. The profile P is k-local swaps single-peaked with respect to A if and only if P is k-perception flip single-peaked with respect to A.
Proof. Given two total orders on the candidate set C, we define a permutation p(T 1 , T 2 ) from {1, . . . , m} to {1, . . . , m} as follows: i maps to j if the i-th largest element in T 1 equals the j-th largest element in T 2 . For T 1 : bac and T 2 : cab we have p(T 1 , T 2 ) = 321, where 321 is a short form for the permutation {1 → 3, 2 → 2, 3 → 1}. Note that given a vote V and an axis A, the vote V is single-peaked with respect to A if and only if p(A, V ) consists of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. (The top-ranked candidate in V corresponds to 1 in the permutation, hence V being single-peaked with respect to A corresponds to p(A, V ) being a V-shaped sequence.) Performing swaps in either V or A implies that the permutation p(A, V ) is permuted. Swapping the j-th largest and the (j+1)-th largest element in V implies that j and j + 1 are exchanged in p(A, V ). Analogously, swapping the i-th and (i+1)-th largest element on A implies that in p(A, V ) the elements in position i and i + 1 are exchanged. If we view a sequence of swaps as a permutation σ, then the number of swaps is equal to the number of inversions in σ, i.e., the number of pairs i < j with σ(i) > σ(j). In the case of swaps in the vote, the permutation σ is directly applied to p(A, V ); in the case of swaps in the axis the inverse σ −1 is applied to p(A, V ). Consequently, a vote V can be made single-peaked with respect to A by at most k swaps if and only if there exists a permutation σ with at most k inversions such that σ applied to p(A, V ) consists of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. Analogously, an axis A can be transformed by at most k swaps so that a vote V is single-peaked if and only if there exists a permutation σ with at most k inversions such that σ −1 applied to p(A, V ) consists of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. The statement of the lemma follows now from the well-known fact that the number of inversions in a permutation π equals the number of inversions in π −1 and, consequently, using the inverse permutations we can transform a series of swaps in V to a series of swaps in A -and vice versa.
k-Candidate Partition (CP )
We now consider a candidate analog of k-additional axes. Whereas k-additional axes requires a partition of votes, now we partition the set of candidates such that all of the restricted profiles are single-peaked consistent. This notion is useful for example in the following situation. Each candidate has an opinion on a controversial Yes/No-issue. Depending on their own preference voters will always rank all Yes-candidates before or after all Nocandidates. It might be that when considering only the Yes-or only the No-candidates, the election is single-peaked. Therefore, if we acknowledge the importance of this Yes/No-issue and partition the candidates accordingly, we may obtain two single-peaked elections.
Definition 3.9. Let C 1 , . . . , C k+1 be a partition of C. A profile P is k-candidate partition single-peaked with respect to an axis A and C 1 , . . . , C k+1 if the profiles P[C 1 ], . . . , P[C k+1 ] are single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-candidate partition single-peaked consistent if there exist an axis A and a partition C 1 , . . . , C k+1 of C such that P is kcandidate partition single-peaked with respect to A and C 1 , . . . , C k+1 . Let CP(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-candidate partition single-peaked consistent.
Note that CP(P) ≤ m 2 always holds. Example 1 (continued). We partition the candidates into C 1 = {a, e} and C 2 = {b, c, d}. Notice that P[C 1 ] is trivially single-peaked consistent because it contains only two candidates. Furthermore, P[C 2 ] contains only votes of the form bcd and dcb. Thus, CP(P) = 1.
We remark that k-candidate partition is related to the notion of k-peaked elections, introduced by Yang and Guo (2014) . A profile is k-peaked with respect to an axis A if for every vote V there exists a partition that yields single-peakedness of this vote with respect to A. In this sense, the k-peaked distance can be considered a local variant of the k-candidate partition distance.
k-Clones (CL) Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2012) introduced clone sets in elections. A clone set is a set of candidates that are ranked consecutively in every vote, but not necessarily in the same order. In order to reach single-peakedness, Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko introduced the procedure of decloning, where they replace clone sets by a single candidate contained in this clone set. The distance to single-peakedness is the minimal number of clones that need to be removed from the election via decloning in order to make it single-peaked.
Definition 3.10. We say that the profile P is k-clones single-peaked with respect to an axis A, if we can obtain a set C ′ ⊆ C by removing at most k clones from C via decloning such that the preference profile P[C ′ ] is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, we say that the profile P is k-clones single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-clones single-peaked with respect to A. Let CL(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-clones single-peaked consistent.
Note that CL(P) ≤ m − 1 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). In our example we can obtain single-peakedness by decloning {a, b} and {d, e}. Since CD(P) = 2 and deleting candidates is more general than decloning, CL(P) can not be less than 2. Thus, CL(P) = 2.
k-Width (WI )
Clustered single-peakedness, as introduced by Cornaz et al. (2012) , is a notion strongly related to the clones measure (clone sets are called clusters in their paper). Given a partition of the candidates into clone sets such that the preferences are single-peaked after decloning, the width of a partition is the size of the largest clone set minus one. Since there are several partitions of preferences into clone sets, the distance single-peaked width is defined as the minimum width among all possible partitions of candidates into clone sets.
Definition 3.11. We say that the profile P is k-width single-peaked with respect to an axis A, if we can obtain a partition of C into clone sets C 1 , . . . , C ℓ such that the size of the largest clone set is k + 1 and the profile resulting from decloning is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, we say that the profile P is k-width single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-width single-peaked with respect to A. Let WI(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-width single-peaked consistent.
Note that WI(P) ≤ m − 1 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Again, partition C into the clone sets C 1 = {a, b}, C 2 = {c}, and C 3 = {d, e}. The resulting decloned profile is single-peaked, the size of the largest clone set is two, and thus WI(P) = 1.
Another notion appearing in the literature is the Swoon distance introduced by Faliszewski et al. (2014) . A profile P is (k, k ′ )-Swoon with respect to A if by removing the top k and the last k ′ candidates from each vote yields a partial profile that is single-peaked with respect to A. Due to the two parameters k and k ′ , this notion does not immediately yield a clear definition of distance and hence we have excluded it from our study. Note, however, that Local Candidate Deletion is a natural generalization of this concept.
Decision Problems
We now introduce the decision problems we will study. We define the following problems for X ∈ {Voter Deletion, Candidate Deletion, Local Candidate Deletion, Additional Axes, Global Swaps, Local Swaps, Candidate Partition, Clones, Width}.
X Single-Peaked Consistency
Given:
An election E = (C, P) and a positive integer k. Question: Is P k-X single-peaked consistent?
X Single-Peaked Evaluation
An election E = (C, P), a positive integer k and an axis 2 A.
Question: Is P k-X single-peaked with respect to A?
Clearly, the X Single-Peaked Evaluation is computationally at most as hard as X Single-Peaked Consistency, since the evaluation problem has the axis as additional input. The complexity of these problems has not been studied with the exception of kClones Single-Peaked Consistency and k-Width Single-Peaked Consistency, both of which are solvable in polynomial time (Elkind et al., 2012; Cornaz et al., 2013) . We settle the complexity of all remaining notions in Section 6 and 6.3.
Basic Results about Single-Peaked Profiles
We start with a simple observation which we will use in several proofs.
Lemma 4.1. Let P be a preference profile containing the vote ≻: c 1 . . . c m and its reverse ≻. Then P is either single-peaked with respect to the axis c 1 > · · · > c m (and its reverse) or it is not single-peaked at all.
Proof. Since the vote ≻ ranks c m last while the vote ≻ ranks c 1 last, these candidates have to be at the left-most and right-most position on any compatible axis. Note that c 1 is the top-ranked candidate of ≻. Hence this already determines the position of all other candidates. Consequently only two axes are possible:
Lemma 4.2 provides an alternative characterization of single-peakedness.
Lemma 4.2. Given an election (C, P), the profile P is not single-peaked consistent with respect to an axis A if and only if for all axes A there is some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates c i , c j , c k ∈ C such that c i > c j > c k on axis A, and c i ≻ c j holds as well as c k ≻ c j .
Proof. Assume that P is not single-peaked consistent. Then, for each axis A, there has to exist some voter v that is not single-peaked with respect to A. Let c be the top-ranked candidate of voter v. Then there exist candidates c 1 , c 2 ∈ C with either c > c 1 > c 2 or c 2 > c 1 > c such that c 2 ≻ c 1 . Depending on whether c > c 1 > c 2 or c 2 > c 1 > c we can instantiate (c i , c j , c k ) with either (c, c 1 , c 2 ) or with (c 2 , c 1 , c). It is now easy to see that
Let A be an axis on C. For the converse direction assume that there is some voter v and three candidates c i , c j , c k ∈ C such that c i > c j > c k on axis A, c i ≻ c j and c k ≻ c j . Notice that c j cannot be the top-ranked candidate of voter v as this would contradict c i ≻ c j and c k ≻ c j . Thus, the top-ranked candidate c lies either left or right of c j on axis A. We consider only the first case -the other case can be dealt with analogously. It holds that c > c j > c k . Definition 2.1 now requires c ≻ c j ≻ c k for v to be single-peaked with respect to A. This condition is, however, violated by our assumption c k ≻ c j . Therefore P is not single-peaked consistent.
The following observation says that any subelection of a single-peaked election is also single-peaked.
Lemma 4.3. Let (C, P) be a given election and C ′ ⊆ C. If P is single-peaked consistent then also P[C ′ ] is single-peaked consistent.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is some C ′ ⊆ C such that P[C ′ ] is not single-peaked consistent. Let A be an arbitrary axis ordering C. By Lemma 4.2 there is some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates c i , c j , c k ∈ C ′ such that c i > c j > c k on the axis A[C ′ ], c i ≻ c j and c k ≻ c j . Then, however, it also holds that c i > c j > c k on the axis A since A is an extension of A[C ′ ]. Therefore the right-hand side of Lemma 4.2 holds for every axis A on C. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, P is not single-peaked consistent.
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the single-peaked classification theorem of Ballester and Haeringer (2011) . For completeness we prove this much simpler statement directly.
Lemma 4.4. An election (C, P) is not single-peaked if there exist three candidates c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ C and three votes V 1 , V 2 , V 3 ∈ P such that, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, c i is ranked last in
Proof. Consider any axis A. Since all three candidates c 1 , c 2 , c 3 are ranked last in one of the votes, the condition in Lemma 4.2 is necessarily satisfied.
Relations between Notions of Nearly Single-Peakedness
Theorem 5.1 shows several inequalities that hold for the distance measures under consideration. We hereby show how these measures relate to each other. For an overview consult Figure 1 .
Theorem 5.1. Let (C, P) be an election. Then the following inequalities hold:
(1) LS(P) ≤ GS(P).
(5) VD(P) ≤ GS(P).
(9) CP(P) ≤ WI(P).
(2) LCD(P) ≤ CD(P).
(6) AA(P) ≤ VD(P).
(10) CD(P) ≤ CL(P).
This list is complete in the following sense: Inequalities that are not listed here and that do not follow from transitivity do not hold in general. The resulting partial order with respect to ≤ is displayed in Figure 1 as a Hasse diagram.
Proof. Inequalities 1 and 2 are immediate consequences from the definitions since LS permits more swaps than GS and LCD is more flexible than CD . Inequalities 3 and 4 are due to the fact that swapping two candidates in a vote is at most as effective as removing one of these candidates. Similarly, for Inequality 5 observe that removing the corresponding voter is at least as effective as swapping two candidates in the vote. Concerning Inequality 6 observe that instead of deleting a voter we can always add an additional axis for this voter. Inequality 7 follows from the fact that putting each deleted candidate in its own partition leads to single-peakedness if deleting these candidates does. In order to show Inequality 8 let P be k-local swaps single-peaked consistent. This means that there exists an axis A such that after performing at most k swaps per voter, P becomes single-peaked with respect to A. Without loss of generality assume that the axis A is c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c m . We now partition the candidates in k + 1 sets S 0 , . . . , S k . This is done by putting the i-th largest element of A into the (i modulo k + 1)-th set.
Since we assume that A is c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c m , we can equivalently say that c i is put into the (i modulo k + 1)-th set, i.e., the c 1 in S 1 , the c 2 in S 2 , the c k in S k and c k+1 in
is not single-peaked with respect to A[S]. By Lemma 4.2 there exists some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates c x , c y , c z ∈ C with x < y < z, c x ≻ c y and c z ≻ c y . On axis A the distance between c x and c y respectively c y and c z is at least k + 1, i.e., at least k elements lie in between them. We know that at most k swaps in ≻ can make this vote single-peaked with respect to A. Let ≻ ′ denote this swapped vote. Necessarily, these swaps have to either cause that
(depending whether the top-ranked candidate of ≻ ′ is right or left of c y ). Let us focus on the case that the swaps ensure that c y ≻ ′ c y−1 ≻ ′ · · · ≻ ′ c x+1 ≻ ′ c x -the other case is analogous. For ≻, contrary to ≻ ′ , it holds that c x ≻ c y . Hence these swaps have to cause that c y ≻ ′ c x holds. In addition, at least k elements, namely c x+1 , . . . , c y−1 , have to be in between them. This requires at least k + 1 swaps which contradicts the fact that at most k swaps suffice. Therefore, for all partition sets S, P[S] is single-peaked consistent and CP(P) ≤ LS(P).
To prove Inequality 9, consider a partition into clone sets. If we partition C in sets so that every set contains at most one element from each clone set, then we obtain a partition consisting of WI(P) + 1 sets, since the original partition consisted of sets with at most WI(P) + 1 elements. Clearly, the given profile is WI(P)-candidate partition single-peaked with respect to this partition and hence CP(P) ≤ WI(P).
Inequality 10 is an immediate consequence of the definitions since removing clones is a restricted form of deleting candidates. To see Inequality 11 note that CL is the total number of candidates removed via decloning whereas WI only measures the number of candidates removed in the largest clone set.
For Inequality 12 let C ′ be the reduced candidate set obtained by decloning and let A ′ be an axis for P[C ′ ]. We will show that by building upon A ′ we can construct an axis compatible with all votes that order certain candidates (D 1 ∪ D 2 , as defined below) in the same way. Let D 1 be the set of all candidates appearing in clone sets of size at least 2 and let D 2 be the set of all right and left neighbors on A of candidates in D 1 . The size of D 1 can be bounded by 2 · CL(P), since every for every candidate removed by decloning there is at most one candidate in this clone set that is not decloned. Consequently, the size of D 2 can be bounded by 4 · CL(P). Clearly, the total number of permutations on D 1 ∪ D 2 is bounded by (6 · CL(P))!. We use for each possible permutation of D 1 ∪ D 2 a separate axis, i.e., two votes share the same axis only if they agree on the order of all candidates in D 1 ∪ D 2 . Let T be a fixed order on D 1 ∪ D 2 and let c be a candidate that is not contained in A ′ , i.e., c has been removed by decloning. Further let d the representative of c in A ′ (the clone of c) and let e and f be the elements left and right of d on A ′ . Candidate c can be inserted in A ′ as follows. Note that neither e nor f cannot lie in between c and d on T ; this would contradict our assumption that c and d are contained in the same clone set but not e and f . Three case distinctions arise: If c is larger than d, e, f with respect to T , i.e., in all votes under consideration, then d is larger than e and f with respect to T ; we place c next to d (on either side). If c is in between d and e or in between d and f , we place it in between these two candidates. If c is the smaller than d, e, f with respect to T then also d is smaller than e and f . Such votes would not be single-peaked with respect to A ′ ; this case cannot arise. We repeat this procedure for all candidates not yet placed on A ′ and obtain an axis compatible with all votes in the profile that agree with T . It remains to show that these are indeed all inequalities that hold for these measures. To this end we provide counterexamples for each remaining case of the following form: to show that measure X cannot be bounded measure Y, we present an election with arbitrary large X and constant Y. Table 1 offers an overview by pointing to the corresponding counterexample. In the following examples we assume that m, n ≥ 4.
Counterexample 1 (VD cannot be bounded by CD, AA and CP): Consider the preference profile on the candidate set C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } with the following 2m votes:
• There are m votes of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c m .
• There are m votes of the form: c m c 2 c 3 . . . c m−1 c 1 .
The corresponding preference profile P is not single-peaked consistent. This is because c 2 has to be next to both c 1 and c m on any suitable axis but both have to be either the left-most or right-most element. Consequently, VD(P) = m. Removing candidates instead of voters is far more useful in this case. When we remove either c 1 or c m , P becomes singlepeaked and hence CD(P) = 1. Since we have only two distinct votes, we require two axes to make P single-peaked and hence AA(P) = 1. Furthermore, notice that we can obtain single-peaked consistency by partitioning the candidates into two sets C 1 = {c 1 , c m } and C 2 = {c 2 , . . . , c m−1 }, hence CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 2 (Neither GS nor LS can be bounded by AA, CD, LCD and CP): This counterexample is similar to the previous one but P consists of only two votes. Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c 3m+1 } be the set of candidates.
• There is one vote of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c 3m+1 .
• There is one vote of the form: c 3m+1 c 2 c 3 . . . c 3m c 1 .
If we consider P [{c 1 , c m+1 , c 2m+1 , c 3m+1 }], we observe that this restricted profile is not single-peaked. Consequently, by Lemma 4.3, P is not single-peaked as well. If we want to make P single-peaked via swaps, at least two of {c 1 , c m+1 , c 2m+1 , c 3m+1 } have to swap position. This requires at least m swaps and consequently GS(P) ≥ LS(P) ≥ m. Since there are only two votes, AA(P) = VD(P) = 1. As in the previous counterexample removing either c 1 or c 3m+1 yields a single-peaked profile and hence LCD(P) = CD(P) = CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 3 (Neither CD nor LCD can be bounded by VD, AA and CP): This time we consider three votes on the candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c 2m }.
• There is one vote ≻ 1 of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c 2m .
• There is one vote ≻ 2 of the form: c 2m c 2m−1 . . . c 1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 3 of the form: c m . . . c 1 c m+1 . . . c 2m .
By Lemma 4.1 we only have to consider the axis c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c 2m for P = (≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , ≻ 3 ). The third vote ≻ 3 is however not single-peaked with respect to this axis. Hence VD(P) = AA(P) = 1. Also, we have that CP(P) = 1 since P[{c 1 , . . . , c m }] and P[{c m+1 , . . . , c 2m }] are single-peaked consistent. However, we have to remove a lot of candidates to obtain a single-peaked profile. Indeed, we have to remove candidates such that the indices of the remaining candidates in ≻ 3 are either increasing or decreasing. That are at least m − 1 to remove and hence CD(P) ≥ LCD(P) ≥ m − 1.
Counterexample 4 (Neither VD, GS nor CD can be bounded by LCD and LS): We consider an election with 3n votes on the candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c 3n }.
• There are n votes ≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c 3n .
• There are n votes ≻ n+1 , . . . , ≻ 2n of the form: c 3n c 3n−1 . . . c 1 .
• The remaining votes are obtained from the first vote by swapping the last two candidates in the i-th block consisting of three candidates. Formally, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is a vote ≻ 2n+i of the form: c 1 . . . c 3(i−1)−1 c 3(i−1) c 3(i−1)+2 c 3(i−1)+1
i-th block c 3i . . . c 3n
Let P = (≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ 3n ). By using Lemma 4.4 it is easy to check that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P[{c 3(i−1)+2 , c 3(i−1)+1 , c 3i }] is not single-peaked consistent. By Lemma 4.3, P is not single-peaked consistent. Also, this implies that we have to remove at least one candidate in each set {c 3(i−1)+2 , c 3(i−1)+1 , c 3i } in order to make P single-peaked consistent. Therefore CD(P) ≥ n. Since GS(P) ≥ CD(P) also GS(P) ≥ n. We now want to prove a lower bound on VD(P). If we delete n − 1 votes then at least one vote of {≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n }, one of {≻ n+1 , . . . , ≻ 2n } and one of {≻ 2n+1 , . . . , ≻ 3n } remains. Again by Lemma 4.3 and 4.4, P is not single-peaked consistent. Hence VD(P) > n − 1. Finally, notice that the votes ≻ 2n+1 , . . . , ≻ 3n can be turned into vote ≻ 1 by a single swap, which shows that LS(P) = 1. Since LCD(P) ≤ LS(P) also LCD(P) = 1.
Counterexample 5 (AA cannot be bounded by CD, LCD and CP): In this example we use n votes on the candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c n+1 }.
• For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, there is one vote ≻ k of the form:
Let us consider the preference profile P = (≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n ). All votes have the same top-ranked candidate but different candidates in the second place. If this preference profile was single-peaked then these second-place candidates had to be either left or right of the peak. This is not possible for three or more candidates. Hence the profile P containing three or more votes is not single-peaked. By the previous argument AA(P) ≥ n 3 − 1. Deleting c n+1 however makes P single-peaked with respect to the axis c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c n and hence CD(P) = LCD(P) = CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 6 (AA cannot be bounded by LS): We consider n votes on 4n candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c 4n }.
• For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, there is one vote ≻ k of the form: c 1 . . . c 4k−4 c 4k c 4k−2 c 4k−1 c 4k−3 c 4k+1 . . . c 4n .
Let P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ). The preference profile P is not single-peaked consistent since the restricted profiles P[{c k−3 , c k−2 , c k−1 , c k }], k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are neither. With five swaps in each vote we can make these votes identical and hence LS(P) ≤ 5. Even any pair of votes in P is not single-peaked. Hence AA(P) ≥ n 2 . Counterexample 7 (CP cannot be bounded by LCD): Consider an election with 3n votes on the candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c 3n }.
• For each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3n, there is one vote ≻ k of the form:
Since the lowest ranked candidates have to be either at the left-most or right-most position on the axis and there are more than two lowest ranked candidates, this profile is not single-peaked consistent. However, when the last-ranked candidate is removed in each vote, the profile becomes single-peaked consistent and hence LCD(P) = 1. Concerning CP(P) notice that any partition into n sets contains a set with at least three candidates and thus, by Lemma 4.4 does not yield a single-peakedness. Hence n candidate partitions are not enough to obtain single-peaked consistency and hence CP(P) ≥ n.
Counterexample 8 (CP cannot be bounded by VD and AA): Consider the candidate set C = {c 1 , . . ., c m 2 } and the following three votes:
• There is one vote ≻ 1 of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c m 2 .
• There is one vote ≻ 2 of the form: c m 2 c m 2 −1 . . . c 1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 3 of the form:
This preference profile is not single-peaked but VD(P) = 1 and AA(P) = 1. The candidates, however, have to be partitioned into many sets in order to obtain single-peakedness. First, observe that by Lemma 4.1 we only have to consider the axis c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c m 2 . Let us now consider vote ≻ 3 . Since we have fixed an axis we can consider longest increasing and decreasing subsequences in this vote. Note that both increasing and decreasing subsequences have a length of less than 2m. Hence a subset of the candidates cannot be single-peaked if it contains more than 4m candidates. We therefore have to partition the candidates of P into sets of cardinality at most 4m and by that CP(P) ≥ m 4 − 1. Counterexample 9 (VD and GS cannot be bounded by CL and WI): This counterexample uses 3n votes and three candidates.
• There are n votes are of the form: c 1 c 2 c 3 .
• There are n votes are of the form: c 1 c 3 c 2 .
• There are n votes are of the form: c 2 c 3 c 1 .
Since all three candidates appear at the last position in votes, n votes have to be deleted to make this profile single-peaked. Analogously, at least n swaps have to be performed. Clearly CL and WI can be bounded by 1, since {c 2 , c 3 } can be decloned.
Counterexample 10 (Neither WI nor CL can be bounded by GS, LS, CP, CD, VD, AA, and LCD): Consider an election with four votes and m candidates.
• There is one vote ≻ 1 of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c m .
• There is one vote ≻ 2 of the form: c m c m−1 . . . c 1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 3 of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c m−2 c m c m−1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 4 of the form: c m−1 c m−2 . . . c 1 c m .
Clearly, P is not single-peaked. Swapping candidates c m−1 and c m in ≻ 3 provides us with a single-peaked profile according to axis c 1 > c 2 > · · · > c m , thus GS(P) = 1. Let us consider CL and WI . There are three last ranked candidates: c 1 , c m−1 and c m . At least two of them have to be contained in a clone set. As can easily be verified, such a clone set would have to be of size at least m. Hence, CL(P) ≥ WI(P) ≥ m − 1. Since GS is an upper bound for LS , CP , CD , VD , AA, and LCD , none of them can bound WI or CL.
Counterexample 11 (Neither CD, LCD, GS nor LS can be bounded by WI): We consider an election with three votes and 2m + 1 candidates.
• There is one vote ≻ 1 of the form: c 1 c 2 . . . c 2m+1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 2 of the form: c 2m+1 c 2m . . . c 1 .
• There is one vote ≻ 3 of the form: c 2 c 1 c 4 c 3 . . . c 2m−2 c 2m−3 c 2m c 2m−1 c 2m+1 .
Every candidate with an odd index is part of a valley, i.e., with respect to the axis fixed by ≻ 1 and ≻ 2 all candidates with odd indices are ranked below their two neighbors with respect to ≻ 3 . Hence LCD is at least m and by the Inequalities (2), (3) and (4) so are CD , GS and LS . On the contrary, if we put, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, c 2i and c 2i−1 in a clone set, we obtain a single-peaked profile. Since all these clone sets are of size 2, WI is bounded by 1. and the order in these sets is given by the sequence s and the rules as defined above.
It is immediate that we have to remove m candidates to make this profile single-peaked, i.e., CD(P) = m. By Inequality 10, CL(P) ≥ m. In contrast, grouping c 3i−2 , c 3i−1 , c 3i together in clone sets (for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}) and decloning accordingly yields a singlepeaked profile and hence WI(P) is bounded by 2.
We conclude this section by illustrating how the inequalities stated in Theorem 5.1 can be used to obtain new results. More specifically, we will show that there are preference profiles that are close to being single-peaked but do not have a weak Condorcet winnerin contrast to single-peaked profiles for which a weak Condorcet winner is guaranteed. A weak Condorcet winner is a candidate that is preferred over all other candidates by at least half of the voters.
Proposition 5.2. For every m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 1 there is an election E = (C, P) with 2n + 1 votes and m candidates such that GS(P) = 1, CL(P) = WI(P) = 2 and P does not have a weak Condorcet winner.
Proof. Let the set of candidates be C = {a, b, c} ∪ {d 1 , . . . , d m−3 }. The profile P contains the following votes: It is straight-forward to verify that the profile P does not have a weak Condorcet winner since it contains a cycle on a, b, c. Notice that P becomes single-peaked with respect to axis b > a > c > d 1 > · · · > d m−3 if we swap candidates b and c in the first vote. Hence, we know that GS(P) = 1. Furthermore, we obtain a single-peaked profile via decloning the clone set {a, b, c} and consequently CL(P) = WI(P) = 2.
Due to the inequalities stated in Theorem 5.1, the result of Proposition 5.2 holds also if GS(P) is replaced by one of the measures VD , CD , LCD , LS , AA, and CP . (In principle these measures could be smaller than GS but the profile is not single-peaked and the distance is only 1.) Therefore, even a distance of 1 to single-peakedness (with respect to the VD , CD , LCD , LS , AA, CP , and GS ) does not help to avoid the Condorcet paradox.
Let us briefly consider profiles with CL(P) = 1 or WI(P) = 1.
Proposition 5.3. An election E = (C, P) with CL(P) = 1 or WI(P) = 1 has a weak Condorcet winner.
Proof. If this statement holds for WI(P) = 1, it also holds for CL(P) = 1 since all profiles with CL(P) = 1 satisfy WI(P) = 1. Let C 1 , . . . , C k be a partition of candidates into clone sets so that decloning these sets yields a single-peaked profile. Let C ′ be the corresponding set of decloned candidates, i.e., P[C ′ ] is single-peaked. Let w be a weak Condorcet winner of P[C ′ ] and let w ∈ C i . Observe that |C i | ≤ 2 since WIP = 1. For all candidates c ∈ C \ C i and all candidates d ∈ C i , d is preferred to c by at least half the voters of P. If C i = {w}, w is a weak Condorcet winner in P. If |C i | = 2 and the number of voters is odd, one of these two candidates is preferred over the other by more than half of the voters in P; hence this preferred candidate is a weak Condorcet winner. If |C i | = 2 and the number of voters is even, either one of these two candidates is preferred over the other by more than half of the voters in P and thus is a weak Condorcet winner or these two candidates are preferred over each other by exactly half of the voters, hence they are both weak Condorcet winners.
Computational Results
In this section we study the complexity of X Single-Peaked Consistency and X SinglePeaked Evaluation for X ∈ {Voter Deletion, Candidate Deletion, Local Candidate Deletion, Additional Axes, Global Swaps, Local Swaps, Candidate Partition}. The general theme is that X Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete whereas X SinglePeaked Evaluation is solvable in polynomial time. The exception is the candidate deletion distance, for which also the consistency problem requires only polynomial time. We do not consider the Clones and Width distance here as it was already established that the corresponding consistency and evaluation problems are solvable in polynomial time (Elkind et al., 2012; Cornaz et al., 2013) .
Hardness Results
We start with the complexity analysis of voter deletion single-peaked consistency. In the reduction we are going to cascade two or more preference profiles. The following definition captures this operation.
Definition 6.1. Let (C 1 , P 1 ) and (C 2 , P 2 ) be two elections with C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅. Furthermore, let P 1 = (≻ ′ 1 , . . . , ≻ ′ n ) and P 2 = (≻ ′′ 1 , . . . , ≻ ′′ n ). We define P 1 ≻ P 2 = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ), where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n the total order ≻ i is defined by
Note that P 1 ≻ P 2 is always a preference profile on C 1 ∪ C 2 .
Lemma 6.2. Let (C 1 , P 1 ) and (C 2 , P 2 ) be two elections with C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅. Assume that:
• P 1 and P 2 are single-peaked consistent with respect to the axes A 1 and A 2 , respectively.
• The votes in P 2 have at most 2 distinct top-ranked candidates.
• These (two) top-ranked candidates are adjacent on the axis A 2 .
Then P 1 ≻ P 2 is single-peaked.
Proof. We are going to construct an axis A in a way that P 1 ≻ P 2 is single-peaked with respect to A. First we split A 2 in two parts A ′ 2 and A ′′ 2 . If P 2 contains votes with two distinct top-ranked candidates (which have to be adjacent), we split A 2 in between these two candidates. If all votes in P 2 share the same top-ranked candidate, we split A 2 left of this candidate (this is arbitrary). The new axis A is A ′ 2 followed by A 1 and then A ′′ 2 , i.e., A ′ 2 > A 1 > A ′′ 2 . The correctness proof of this construction is straight-forward.
Before we start with the hardness proof, let us first make the following observation. We now show NP-hardness via a reduction from the clique problem, a well-known NPcomplete problem. We remark that the following result has been proven independently by Bredereck et al. (2016) in a more general form that also applies to domain restrictions other than single-peakedness.
Clique
Given:
A graph (V G , E G ) and a positive integer s. Question: Does (V G , E G ) contain a clique of size s, i.e., has the graph (V G , E G ) an induced subgraph of size s that is complete?
Theorem 6.4. Voter Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. To show hardness we reduce from Clique. Let V G = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. Each vertex v i has four corresponding candidates c 1 i , . . . , c 4 i . We consequently have C = {c 1 1 , . . . , c 4 1 , c 1 2 , . . . , c 4 2 , . . . , c 1 n , . . . , c 4 n }. The votes directly correspond to vertices and thus P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ). In order to define the votes we introduce three functions creating partial votes. For  a, b, c, d ∈ C, let f v (a, b, c, d) = acbd, f e (a, b, c, d) = cbda, and f ne (a, b, c, d) = dcba. If we consider f v , f e and f ne as votes then by Observation 6.3 (f v , f e ) and (f e , f ne ) are singlepeaked consistent but (f v , f ne ) is not. Next we define a function p(i, j), mapping a pair in {1, . . . , n} 2 to a total order on {c 1 j , . . . , c 4 j }.
The intuition behind function p(i, j) is to encode a row of the adjacency matrix of G as a vote in the preference profile P. To this end, we put in "cell" (i, j) the result of f e if there is an edge between i and j. In case there is no edge between i and j we put the result of f ne in cell (i, j). In the special case i = j (we are in the diagonal of the matrix) we put the result of f v in the cell.
Let the partial profiles representing the columns of the adjacency matrix be defined as P j = (p (1, j) , . . . , p(n, j)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We are now going to define the preference profile P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ) by P = P 1 ≻ P 2 ≻ · · · ≻ P n .
To conclude the construction let E = (C, P) and k = n − s, i.e., we are allowed to delete k voters from E in order to obtain a single-peaked profile. The intention behind the construction is that the voters in a single-peaked profile will correspond to a clique. We claim that G has a clique of cardinality s if and only if it is possible to remove at most k voters from P in order to make the resulting preference profile single-peaked consistent.
"⇒" Assume that there is a clique I = {≻ i 1 , . . . , ≻ is } with |I| = s. Let P ′ = (≻ i 1 , . . . , ≻ is ). Thereby we keep only those voters whose corresponding vertices are contained in the clique I. Observe that the election E ′ = (C, P ′ ) can be obtained by deleting k = n−s voters from the profile P. It remains to show that P ′ is indeed single-peaked consistent.
. . , n}. Since I is a clique, for each ≻ x , ≻ y ∈ I, x = y, there is an edge {x, y} ∈ E G . Thus, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, P ′ [C i ] does not contain an instantiation both of f v and of f ne . By Observation 6.3, we conclude that P ′ [C i ] is singlepeaked consistent. Now we intend to use Lemma 6.2 to show that also P ′ is single-peaked. Note that P ′ [C i ] contains at most two distinct top-ranked candidates. In addition, these two top-ranked candidates are adjacent on the axis which gives single-peaked consistency, as can be seen as follows: Consider again Observation 6.3. For (f v , f e ) the top-ranked candidates a and c are adjacent on the axis a > c > b > d. The same holds for (f e , f ne ) with axis d > c > b > a and c, d as top-ranked candidates. Since all conditions of Lemma 6.2 are fulfilled, we can apply it iteratively. Therefore,
etc. are single-peaked consistent and hence also P ′ is single-peaked consistent.
"⇐" Assume that E * = (C, P * ) is an election that has been obtained from E by deleting at most k voters from P such that P * is single-peaked. Then there exists also an election E ′ = (C, P ′ ) which is obtained from E by deleting exactly k voters from P such that P ′ is single-peaked. This is because deleting additional voters from a single-peaked profile can never break single-peakedness. Consequently P ′ contains s votes. Let i 1 , . . . , i s ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that P ′ = (≻ i 1 , . . . , ≻ is ). We claim that the vertices {v i 1 , . . . , v is } form a clique in G. As before, let C i = {c 1 i , c 2 i , c 3 i , c 4 i } for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 4.3 we know that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, P ′ [C i ] is single-peaked consistent. Then, by Observation 6.3, each column must not contain an instance of f v together with an instance of f ne . Let j ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i s }. Observe that by construction vote ≻ j contains an instance of f v on candidate set C j . Consequently, all other votes in P ′ have to be instantiations of f e on C j and thus vertex v j is adjacent to all other vertices in {v i 1 , . . . , v is }. Since j is arbitrary, the vertices v i 1 , . . . , v is form a clique.
We now turn to additional axes single-peaked consistency. Here we make use of a similar construction as presented in Theorem 6.4 with the difference that we now show NP-hardness via a reduction from the partition into cliques problem (Garey & Johnson, 1979) .
Partition Into Cliques
Given:
A graph (V G , E G ) and a positive integer s. Question: Is it possible to partition V G into s sets such that each set of vertices induces a clique on (V G , E G )?
Theorem 6.5. Additional Axes Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. Hardness is shown by a reduction from Partition Into Cliques. For the reduction we use the same transformation as presented in the proof of Theorem 6.4 to obtain an election. Then we set k = s − 1, i.e., we are searching for a partition of the voters into s disjoint sets such that each of the partitions is single-peaked consistent. Due to the oneto-one correspondence between voters and vertices we can use the partition of the vertices to obtain a partition of the voters and vice versa. With arguments similar to the proof of Theorem 6.4 one can show that a set of vertices is a clique if and only if the corresponding profile is single-peaked consistent.
Remark 6.6. The Partition Into Cliques problem is NP-complete even when one is asked to partition the graph into three cliques. Consequently it follows from the proof of Theorem 6.5 that Additional Axes Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete even for k = 2, i.e., for deciding single-peaked consistency with two additional axes.
In the proofs of our next two results, we will provide reductions from the NP-complete Minimum Radius problem (Frances & Litman, 1997) . It is defined as follows:
Minimum Radius
Given:
A set of strings S ⊆ {0, 1} ℓ and a positive integer s.
Question: Has S a radius of at most s, i.e., is there a string α ∈ {0, 1} l such that each string in S has a Hamming distance to α of at most s?
Theorem 6.7. Local Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is NPcomplete.
Proof. Given a string β ∈ S, let β(i) denote the bit value at the i-th position in β. We are going to construct an LCD Single-Peaked Consistency instance. Each string in S = {β 1 , . . . , β n } will correspond to two voters. Each bit of the strings will correspond to two candidates. In addition, we have 2ℓs + 2 extra candidates. Consequently, we have
. . , c ′′ ℓs+1 }. We define the preference profile with the help of two functions creating total orders.
The vote ≻ j , for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is of the form
The preference profile P is now defined as (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n , ≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ). We claim that (C, P) is s-local candidate deletion single-peaked consistent if and only if S has a radius of at most s. "⇐" Suppose that S has a radius of at most s, i.e., there is a string α ∈ {0, 1} ℓ with Hamming distance at most s to each β ∈ S. We consider the following axis A:
We claim that P is single-peaked with respect to A after deleting at most s candidates in each vote. The deletions for vote ≻ j , j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are the following: We delete candidate c 1 i in ≻ j if and only if α(i) = β j (i). The deletions in ≻ j are exactly the same as in ≻ j . These are at most s deletions since the Hamming distance between α and every β ∈ S is at most s. After these deletions all votes are either subsequences of A or its reverse. Hence we obtain a single-peaked consistent profile. "⇒" Let P ′ be the partial, single-peaked consistent profile that was obtained by deleting at most s candidates in each vote. First, note that some c ′ ∈ {c ′ 1 , . . . , c ′ ℓs+1 } has not been deleted in any vote since in total at most ℓ · s different candidates can be deleted. In the same way let c ′′ ∈ {c ′′ 1 , . . . , c ′′ ℓs+1 } be a candidate that has not been deleted in any vote. Now let us consider the profile P ′ [{c ′ , c ′′ , c 1 i , c 2 i }] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. We claim that α ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , defined in the following way, has a Hamming distance of at most s to all bitstrings in S.
First, observe that Case 1 and 2 cannot occur at the same time since then P ′ would not be single-peaked consistent.
Let β j ∈ S, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that if at any position i, β j (i) = α(i) then either c 1 i or c 2 i had to be deleted in the vote ≻ j . Otherwise P ′ would not be single-peaked consistent. Hence |{i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} | α(i) = β j (i)}| ≤ s because otherwise we would require more than s candidate deletions in the corresponding vote ≻ j . Hereby we have shown that the Hamming distance of α and β j is at most s.
Theorem 6.8. Local Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. We use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 6.7. It holds that (C, P) is s-local swaps single-peaked consistent if and only if S has a radius of at most s. This can be shown similarly to the proof of Theorem 6.7 except that we swap candidates instead of deleting them.
The following problem will be useful for showing NP-hardness of Global Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency. Given two votes, ≻ x and ≻ y , let swaps(≻ x , ≻ y ) denote the minimum number of swaps of adjacent candidates needed to make ≻ x and ≻ y equal, i.e., swaps(≻ x , ≻ y ) is the Kendall tau distance of ≻ x and ≻ y .
Kemeny Optimal Aggregation
Given:
An election (C, P), with P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ), and an integer s. Question: Is there a vote ≻ * on C such that 1≤i≤n swaps(≻ i , ≻ * ) ≤ s.
Kemeny Optimal Aggregation was shown to be NP-complete (Bartholdi, Tovey, & Trick, 1989b) . Later, this result was strengthened to require only four voters (Dwork et al., 2001; Biedl, Brandenburg, & Deng, 2009 ).
Theorem 6.9. Global Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. We show NP-hardness of this problem by reduction from Kemeny Optimal Aggregation. Let a Kemeny Optimal Aggregation instance be given by C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } and P = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ n ). We create a new election (C ′ , P ′ ) with C ′ = C ∪ {c . Then it ranks the candidates in C in the same order as ≻ i does. Finally, it orders the candidates c last 1 . . . c last 2k+1 with descending preference, i.e., c last 2k+1 being the last ranked candidate. The preference profile P ′ is now defined as (
We refer to ≻ ′ 1 , . . . , ≻ ′ n as the non-reversed votes and to ≻ ′ 1 , . . . , ≻ ′ n as the reversed votes. We claim that (C ′ , P ′ ) is k-global swaps singlepeaked consistent if and only if (C, P) and s are a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal Aggregation problem.
"⇒" Suppose that (C ′ , P ′ ) is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent. Therefore, one can obtain a profile P S from P ′ by applying at most k = 2s swaps such that P S is singlepeaked consistent with respect to an axis A. Since there are 2k + 1 candidates in the set {c top 1 , . . . , c top 2k+1 } at least one of them must have remained in place in each vote. Analogously, the same holds for one of the candidates contained in the set {c last 1 , . . . , c last 2k+1 }. Let c top and c last denote these two candidates. From Lemma 4.3 we know that P S [{c top , c 1 , . . . , c m , c last }] is single-peaked consistent as well. Observe that all non-reversed votes in P S [{c top , c 1 , . . . , c m , c last }] have c top as top-ranked candidate and c last as last candidate, while in all reversed votes c last is top and c top is the last ranked candidate. By Lemma 4.1 all non-reversed votes in P S [{c 1 , . . . , c m }] must be ordered in the same way and the reversed votes in exactly their reverse order. We denote this ordering of {c 1 , . . . , c m } by ≻ * . Notice that turning the non-reversed votes into ≻ * requires the same number of swaps as turning the reversed votes into ≻ * . Therefore, k 2 = s swaps are sufficient to turn all non-reversed votes into ≻ * . Taken together, ≻ * fulfills all properties to be a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal Aggregation problem.
"⇐" Assume (C, P) and s describe a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal Aggregation problem. Then there is some common ordering ≻ * , which has in total a swap distance of ≤ s to all votes in P. Then, (C ′ , P ′ ) is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent with respect to the axis c or its reverse by using at most k = 2s swaps -s swaps for the primed votes and s swaps for the double-primed votes.
Remark 6.10. Since Kemeny Optimal Aggregation with only four voters is NPcomplete (Dwork et al., 2001) , it follows from the proof of Theorem 6.9 that Global Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete even for eight voters.
A Polynomial-time Algorithm for Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency
In contrast to the previous hardness results, we are able to show that Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency can be decided in polynomial time. The algorithm builds upon the O(n · m) time algorithm for testing single-peaked consistency by Escoffier et al. (2008) . Since we make some modifications to the algorithm and also for the sake of completeness we present it here as well. For the remainder of this section let (C, P) be an election with n voters and C = {c 1 , . . . , c m }.
The single-peaked consistency algorithm. This algorithm is a modified version of the algorithm by Escoffier et al. (2008) . Before we start with presenting the algorithm, let us fix some notation.
Definition 6.11. For C ′ ⊆ C, let L(P, C ′ ) denote the set of last ranked candidates in
Definition 6.12. An incomplete axis is a total order on a subset of C with a marked position that indicates where further elements may be added. We denote this position by a star symbol, e.g., the incomplete axis c 1 > c 2 > ⋆ > c 3 allows additional candidates to be added right of c 2 and left of c 3 . The boundary of an incomplete axis A, boundary (A), is a quadruple consisting of the two candidates left of the star and the two candidates right of the star, e.g., boundary (c 1 > c 2 > ⋆ > c 3 > c 4 > c 5 ) = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ). If only one or no candidates exist left/right of the star, the corresponding entries in the quadruple are ǫ, e.g., boundary (c 1 > ⋆) = (ǫ, c 1 , ǫ, ǫ).
Given an incomplete axis A and a candidate set C, an axis A ′ extends A if A ′ can be constructed from A ′ by adding elements left or right of the ⋆ symbol.
The algorithm by Escoffier, Lang andÖztürk proceeds iteratively by placing the last ranked candidates that have not yet been placed. Let C ′ be the set of candidates that have not yet been positioned on the (incomplete) axis A. The algorithm checks what kind of constraints follow from each vote. If these constraints do not contradict each other, the set of last ranked candidates L(P, C ′ ) is placed. We denote this procedure by place(A, X) where X = L(P, C ′ ). The procedure place(A, X) returns either a new incomplete axis (extending A by the candidates in X) or the value INCONSISTENT. The algorithm repeatedly invokes place until all elements have been placed or a contradiction has been found. Now we would like to describe place(A, X) in detail since it is used also by our candidate deletion algorithm. Let boundary (A) = (b ′ 1 , b 1 , b 2 , b ′ 2 ), i.e., the current incomplete axis A is given as
If a condition contains a boundary element and this element is ǫ (i.e., it does not exist), corresponding constraints can be ignored. The following cases are considered for each vote ≻ i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In addition to these three cases, the following constraints are applicable independently of the cardinality of L(P, C ′ ). Let x ∈ L(P, C ′ ).
• If b ′ 1 ≻ i b 1 and x ≻ i b 1 , then x can be placed neither left nor right.
• If b ′ 2 ≻ i b 2 and x ≻ i b 2 , then x can be placed neither left nor right.
For each vote ≻ i , these case distinctions yield constraints on placing the candidates in X. If there is a way to place the candidates in X that is compatible with every vote, place(A, X) has been successful and returns the new incomplete axis. (If there is more than one possibility to place X, place chooses arbitrarily.) Otherwise the value INCONSISTENT is returned. To simplify the notation, we define place(A, ∅) to return A.
The following lemma is the main reason why we can employ dynamic programming in our algorithm for deciding the Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency problem.
Lemma 6.13. Let A be an incomplete axis and let X ⊆ C contain one or two candidates not yet placed on A. If P is single-peaked with respect to an axis A ′ that extends A, then it is single-peaked with respect to an extension of the axis returned by place(A, X). If place(A, X) returns INCONSISTENT, then there is no axis A ′ that extends A such that P is single-peaked with respect to A ′ .
Proof. This lemma follows from the correctness proof of the single-peaked consistency algorithm (Escoffier et al., 2008) since the place procedure performs the same steps as this algorithm does. The main difference is that the single-peaked consistency algorithm places all remaining candidates at once as soon there is at most one possibility left. The place procedure continues to place one or two candidates at a time even in that case.
Observation 6.14. The place(A, X) procedure places the candidates in X on the incomplete axis A only considering boundary(A) and does not depend on the full incomplete axis A.
The candidate deletion algorithm. Observation 6.14 states that the (at most) four boundary candidates of an incomplete axis fully determine whether and which further candidates can be placed on the axis. The main idea of our algorithm is to store only incomplete axes that differ in these four candidates, i.e., only incomplete axes with differing boundaries. If two axes with the same boundary are considered, we take the axis with the larger number of candidates. This strategy allows us to use a dynamic programming approach.
Our algorithm resembles the previously described single-peaked consistency algorithm in that it places last ranked candidates first. However, since we are allowed to delete candidates, our algorithm does not terminate if at some point three or more last ranked candidates are encountered (cf. Case 1 in the single-peaked consistency algorithm). Nevertheless, our algorithm utilizes the place procedure and thus can place at most two candidates in each step. To this end, we define a sequence L 1 , . . . , L m of sets, each of which contains a disjoint subset of candidates. Our algorithm places the candidates in L 1 (or a subset of L 1 ) first, then (a subset of) those in L 2 and so on.
The sequence L 1 , . . . , L m is defined as follows:
Note that some L i 's might be empty and that i∈{1,...,m} L i = C. Now, we describe the algorithm. Refer to Algorithm 1 for an overview. The main data structure is an list S containing incomplete axes. Each position in this list is uniquely described by a quadruple of candidates. Consequently, the list has size m 4 . Each incomplete axis is stored in the position that corresponds to the boundary of this axis. We start with the list S containing only the empty incomplete axis ⋆. (Recall that ⋆ marks the position where new candidates can be added to the axis.) Now, the candidates in L 1 are placed. We make a copy of S called S new . Then, we use the place procedure to place the candidates in L 1 on the empty axis. Note that at most two of the candidates in L 1 can be placed, since otherwise we would immediately create two peaks. Thus, we consider every subset of L 1 of size 0, 1 or 2. This gives rise to new incomplete axes. These axes are stored in S new , a copy of S. After all possible axes have been considered, we replace S with S new .
We continue by placing the candidates in L 2 . Again, we copy S to S new . For every incomplete axis A in S, we place any subset of L 2 with size 0, 1 or 2 on A -and again creating new incomplete axes. These axes are stored in S new . At this point, it might be that S new already contains an axis with the same boundary. In this case, we keep the axis with more candidates placed on it.
We repeat this procedure until the candidates in L m are placed as well. The set S now contains for every possible incomplete axis an axis with the same boundary and at least the same number of candidates on it. Thus, S contains a cardinality maximal axis and thus yields the minimum number of candidates that have to be deleted to make it single-peaked.
Theorem 6.15. Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency can be solved in time O(n · m 6 ).
Proof. The runtime bound can be seen as follows. Clearly, L 1 , . . . , L m can be computed in O(m · n) time. The list S has size m 4 . The algorithm places the candidates L 1 first, then L 2 , and so on. We consider O(|L i | 2 ) many subsets of L i (those of cardinality at most 2). Thus, the place procedure is executed at most |L 1 | 2 + |L 2 | 2 + · · · + |L m | 2 times. This number can be bounded by O(m 2 ). Since place has a runtime of O(n), we require in total O(n · m 6 ) time.
Finally, let us remark that very recently a modification of this algorithm has been proposed (Przedmojski, 2016) that improves the runtime to O(m 3 · n).
Complexity of Nearly Single-Peaked Evaluation
In the previous sections we have analyzed the computational complexity of the X SinglePeaked Consistency problem. We now turn to the computational complexity of the related X Single-Peaked Evaluation problem, where the axis is additionally given in the input. Due to this additional information, all X Single-Peaked Evaluation problems are solvable in polynomial time -in contrast to the consistency problems studied in the Section 6.1. Proof. This result is trivial due to the fact that whenever a vote is not single-peaked consistent with respect to axis A we have to delete it. If at most k votes have to be deleted, we know that the profile is k-voter deletion single-peaked consistent with respect to A.
Proposition 6.17. Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time O(n · m 6 ).
Proof. We employ the algorithm for solving Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency, Algorithm 1. The only necessary modification is to change the place procedure in such a way that only placements compatible with the given axis are allowed.
Proposition 6.18. Additional Axes Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time O(k · n · m).
Proof. Evaluation is also trivial for the additional axes distance measure. It suffices to verify that every vote is single-peaked with respect to at least one of the given k + 1 axes.
Theorem 6.19. Local Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time O(n · m 2 · log m).
Proof. For every vote ≻ ∈ P we have to find the minimum number of candidates that have to be deleted. We do this by iterating over all candidates p ∈ C and calculating a cardinality maximal C ′ ⊆ C such that ≻ [C ′ ] is single-peaked and p is top-ranked in ≻ [C ′ ]. For each p, let C 1 be the set of candidates containing p and all candidates left of p on A. We have to find a (not necessarily continuous) subsequence of A[C 1 ] of maximum length that is increasing with respect to ≻ and contains p. Let C ′ 1 be the set of candidates contained in this maximum increasing subsequence. Then, let C 2 be the set of candidates containing p and all candidates right of p. We search for a subsequence of A[C 2 ] of maximum length decreasing with respect to ≻ and contains p. Let C ′ 2 be the set of candidates contained in this maximum decreasing subsequence. In this way, we obtain a selection of candidates C ′ 1 ∪ C ′ 2 (of maximum cardinality) such that ≻ [C ′ 1 ∪ C ′ 2 ] is single-peaked and p is top-ranked in ≻ [C ′ 1 ∪ C ′ 2 ]. We repeat this step for all p ∈ C in order to find the candidate for which |C ′ 1 ∪ C ′ 2 | is maximal; we return LCD(P) = m − |C ′ 1 ∪ C ′ 2 |. We repeat this procedure for every vote. Since computing a longest increasing subsequence can be done for sequences of length n in time O(n · log n) (Schensted, 1961) and we have to do this m times per vote, we obtain the claimed runtime. Proof. Both algorithms rely on the minswaps(C, ≻, A) procedure, which computes the minimal number of swaps required to make vote ≻ single-peaked with respect to A. Let us first describe how this procedure is used and later on give a precise description of minswaps. To solve Global Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation it suffices to execute for each ≻ in P the procedure minswaps(C, ≻, A) and sum over all returned values. If the sum does not exceed the limit k we know that the profile is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent with respect to A. For the Local Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation the procedure is similar. Here, we check whether for every ≻ in P, minswaps(C, ≻, A) ≤ k.
Let us now describe how minswaps(C, ≻, A) works. Its algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 2. The algorithm is based on the observation that one of the two outermost candidates on A has to be ranked last in ≻. These candidates are a and b in the algorithm. It is optimal to swap the lower ranked of these two candidates to the last position. The function bottomdist(a, ≻[C ′ ]) returns the number of swaps required to swap candidate a to the last position in ≻ [C ′ ]. After either a or b has been swapped to the last position, we repeat these steps with both the vote and the axis restricted to those candidates that have not Notion SP-Consistency SP-Evaluation k-Voter Deletion NP-c (Thm. 6.4) in P (Prop. 6.16) k-Local Candidate Deletion NP-c (Thm. 6.7) in P (Thm. 6.19) k-Additional Axes NP-c (Thm. 6.5) in P (Prop. 6.18) k-Global Swaps NP-c (Thm. 6.9) in P (Thm. 6.20) k-Local Swaps NP-c (Thm. 6.8) in P (Thm. 6.20) k-Candidate Deletion in P (Thm. 6.15) in P (Thm. 6.17) k-Clones in P (Elkind et al., 2012) in P (Elkind et al., 2012 ) k-Width in P (Cornaz et al., 2013) been swapped to the last position so far. In this way we obtain a vote with a minimal number of swaps that is single-peaked.
Since the runtime of the procedure minswaps can be bounded by O(m), Global Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation as well as Local Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time O(n · m). Proof. Let C 1 , . . . , C k+1 be the given partition of C. We can solve this problem in O(n · m) time by checking for every C i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, whether P[C i ] is single-peaked with respect to A[C i ].
Conclusions and Open Questions
In this work, we have investigated notions of nearly single-peakedness. We have introduced three new notions of nearly single-peakedness and have studied in addition six already established notions. We have drawn a complete picture of the relations between these notions. For five notions we have shown that deciding nearly single-peaked consistency is NP-complete and for k-candidate deletion we have presented a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, we have analyzed the complexity of the evaluation problem, i.e., the verification task, where the axis is given as additional input. In contrast to consistency, all evaluation problems can be decided in polynomial time. We refer the reader to Table 2 for an overview.
An obvious direction for future work is to determine the complexity of Candidate Partition Single-Peaked Consistency. Also, we want to remark that all notions of nearly single-peakedness presented in this work are not restricted to single-peakedness, but can also be applied to other domain restrictions (such as the single-crossing restriction).
NP-completeness, as we have obtained for several consistency problems, does not rule out the possibility of algorithms that perform well in practice. One approach is to search for fixed-parameter algorithms, i.e., an algorithm with runtime f (k) · poly(n) for some computable function f depending only on parameter k. A first fixed-parameter algorithm for Voter Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is mentioned by Bredereck et al. (2016) . Another approach is the development of approximation algorithms since nearly single-peaked consistency can also be seen as an optimization problem. A detailed treatment of both fpt-and approximation-results for candidate deletion and voter deletion was presented recently for several domain restrictions including single-peakedness (Elkind & Lackner, 2014) . The design of fixed-parameter and approximation algorithms for the remaining notions of nearly single-peakedness deserves further attention.
Another interesting direction for future work is extending our models to manipulative behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. That is, assuming we have a nearly single-peaked electorate according to one of our notions, how computationally expensive is a manipulative action under a certain voting rule? The analysis of manipulation and control in such elections has already been started for some distance measures. In a first step, manipulation and control was introduced in the context of nearly single-peaked elections under several voting rules, pinpointing that under some voting rules even the presence of only one maverick can raise the complexity of manipulative actions from P to NP-completeness (Faliszewski et al., 2014) . In a second step, dichotomy results for manipulation of k-approval and k-veto under nearly single-peaked elections were achieved identifying the exact borders of tractability (Erdélyi et al., 2015) . Still, the impact of nearly single-peakedness on manipulative behavior is far from being fully understood. Finally, there might be further useful and natural distance measures regarding single-peakedness (and other domain restrictions) to be found.
